Abstract-We present online tunable diagnostic and membership protocols for generic time-triggered (TT) systems to detect crashes, send/receive omission faults, and network partitions. Compared to existing diagnostic and membership protocols for TT systems, our protocols do not rely on the single-fault assumption and also tolerate non-fail-silent (Byzantine) faults. They run at the application level and can be added on top of any TT system (possibly as a middleware component) without requiring modifications at the system level. The information on detected faults is accumulated using a penalty/reward algorithm to handle transient faults. After a fault is detected, the likelihood of node isolation can be adapted to different system configurations, including configurations where functions with different criticality levels are integrated. All protocols are formally verified using model checking. Using actual automotive and aerospace parameters, we also experimentally demonstrate the transient fault handling capabilities of the protocols.
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INTRODUCTION
I N both automotive and aerospace X-by-wire applications, TT platforms such as Flexray [15] , TTP/C [21] , SAFEbus [18] , and TT-Ethernet [19] are increasingly being adopted. Some TT platforms disclaim to provide distributed diagnostic and membership services, such as FlexRay, or utilize their specific system-level properties to develop customized solutions, like TTP/C [21] or SAFEbus. Instead, we define online diagnostic and membership protocols as add-on application-level modules that can be integrated as plug-in middleware modules onto any TT system, without (potentially problematic [31] ) interferences with other functionalities or other applications. Our protocols: 1) only use networklevel error detection information that is made available at the application level by TT platforms; 2) do not impose constraints on the scheduling of the system; and 3) have low bandwidth requirements. The protocols can be tuned to meet customized fault coverage and latency requirements. For TT platforms, such as FlexRay and TT-Ethernet, that do not provide a standardized diagnostic or membership protocol, our add-on protocol represents a viable and flexible solution to provide such add-on functionalities.
The key purpose of a diagnostic protocol, in particular if this is used for safety critical subsystems, is to identify faulty nodes within a small diagnostic delay. Nonetheless, a diagnostic protocol also needs to consider resource availability and to avoid declaring correct components as faulty in case of transient faults, which are becoming increasingly frequent [10] . An "ideal" diagnostic protocol would exclude only nodes with permanent internal faults. In practice, however, these faults do not always manifest as permanent faults at the interface of the node (e.g., crashes). They can also manifest as multiple, subsequent intermittent faults (e.g., sparse message omissions) which, to external observers, appear similar to transient faults.
Our diagnostic protocol uses a penalty/reward (p/r) algorithm to distinguish between transient fault and intermittent or permanent faults with stochastically predictable accuracy and coverage [30] . Predictability is provided by a stochastic model that considers faults not only over a single protocol run but also over multiple runs (using an extended fault model). Different from existing diagnostic approaches which rely on system-specific heuristics for handling transient faults (e.g., [18] , [34] ) and like the -count model of [6] , [7] , our generic p/r model can be applied and tuned to each specific implementation in a well-defined manner. However, different from -count, our Fault Detection, Isolation and Reconfiguration (FDIR) model does not assume that the maximum duration of transient faults is bounded and known. It admits closed-form analytical solutions which can be easily evaluated by hand without using modeling tools, and it considers systems running multiple applications with varied criticalities. In this paper, we show for the first time how to integrate a p/r algorithm with an online distributed diagnostic protocol.
Analogous to diagnosis is the membership problem [17] , [2] , which consists of identifying the set of nodes (called membership view) that have received the same history of messages. We show that a variant of our protocol can act as a membership service and detect the formation of multiple cliques of receivers with inconsistent information. Similar to diagnosis, membership protocols also need to consider availability. Our membership protocols are the first ones where the ensured consistency degree can be tuned, using the p/r algorithm, to avoid overreactions to transient faults. The protocol is also extended to detect and tolerate both permanent and transient network partitioning.
An important aspect of our diagnostic and membership protocols is providing consistent diagnostic and membership information to all nodes even in the presence of worstcase (Byzantine) faults. A common feature of TT systems is that non-fail-silent faults at the network level are turned into fail-silent faults. This ensures that correct nodes can still communicate despite the presence of non-fail-silent faulty nodes. SAFEbus, for example, uses double-redundant Bus Interface Units to detect and isolate non-fail-silent faults [18] , whereas TTP/C can use a star network configuration with redundant bus guardians [1] . For this reason, many previous membership protocols for TT systems assume only benign faults (crashes, send, and receive omissions) [21] , [3] , [14] . Although we assume failsilence at the network level, this does not rule out the presence of nondetected errors at the application level where our protocols run. These errors can stem from simple memory corruptions and can result in error propagation at the protocol level if fail-silence is assumed [4] . Our generic protocols are designed to tolerate multiple application-level faults, both silent and nonsilent. The number of tolerated faults grows with the total number of nodes in the system.
The properties of all presented protocols are formally verified per hand proofs and model checking. We have also implemented the diagnostic and membership protocols in a prototype, incorporating actual automotive and aerospace parameters. Using physical fault injection, we experimentally validate the properties of the protocols under several fault scenarios and show how to tune the parameters of the p/r algorithm in a realistic environment.
Overall, our diagnostic and membership protocols are the first with the following key properties:
. Can run on every TT system at application level without imposing scheduling constraints. . Can tolerate Byzantine faults and multiple benign faults. . Are integrated with a tunable p/r algorithm for better transient fault handling. . Have been validated for several fault scenarios using actual automotive and aerospace parameters. . Have been formally verified using a model checker. The paper is organized as follows: Following the related work in Section 2, we introduce the system and fault models in Section 3. The tunable add-on diagnostic protocol and its properties are presented in Section 4. The protocol is extended to a membership protocol in Section 5. The results of formal verification based on model checking are reported in Section 6. Section 7 describes the experimental validation of both protocols. We detail parameter tuning in Section 8. Section 9 discusses the portability of the middleware to different TT platforms.
RELATED WORK
The general diagnosis problem was formulated in the PMC model [27] , where entities in a given set test each other to collect sufficient information to locate the faulty nodes. In online real-time settings, the comparison approach is recommended [25] , where the same functionality is executed on different nodes and the results are compared.
Multiple research efforts have targeted diagnosis for specific error models, and for improving specific attributes such as latency reduction, coverage, and bandwidth. The family of diagnostic protocols for generic synchronous systems proposed by Walter et al. [34] considers a framebased communication scheme where nodes exchange messages in synchronous parallel rounds using a fully connected topology and unidirectional links. Similar to consensus [23] , [2] , all nodes exchange their local view on the correctness of the messages received by the other nodes and combine them using hybrid voting to achieve consistent diagnosis.
We adapt the online diagnosis approach of [34] as a middleware service for TT systems, where multiple nodes may access a shared broadcast bus using a TDMA communication scheme. Our add-on protocol explicitly takes into account the internal scheduling of each node and the overall global communication scheduling of the system, and can be adapted to both frame-based and TDMA communication schemes. Different from [34] , we explicitly consider the cases of communication blackouts that can arise if particularly long transient bursts corrupt all sending slots in a round. We also show how to modify the protocol to provide membership information even in the presence of network partitioning. Finally, our protocol uses the new p/r algorithm to handle transient faults based on the criticality of the applications executing on different nodes.
The problem of group membership is often defined similar to diagnosis [17] . Cristian [11] proposes a membership protocol for synchronous crash-only systems that is based on an expensive fault-tolerant atomic broadcast primitive to achieve consistency. Such an approach is impractical in TT systems due to its high latency and bandwidth requirement. A membership protocol specifically designed for TTP/C systems was proposed by Kopetz and Grunsteidl [21] , proved correct in [3] , formally verified using theorem proving in [26] and model-checked using parameterized verification in [8] . The fault model is the "single-fault assumption": The protocol does not have to tolerate simultaneous faults or non-fail-silent nodes. The protocol allows identification of one fault in the communication of a message and also detects the formation of different cliques of nodes which cannot communicate with each other. The latency is two communication slots in the case of sender faults and two rounds in case of receiver faults. The message complexity is OðNÞ bits per message and OðN 2 Þ bits per round, where N is the number of system nodes. In order to save bandwidth, TTP/C implementations of the algorithm encode the messages in the CRC. If a (possibly transient) faulty node is detected, it is generally restarted. However, this can generate a window of vulnerability to subsequent failures. If clique detection is not executed, the message complexity of the protocol can be reduced to 1 bit per message [29] . An extension of the TTP/ C protocol was proposed by Ezichelvan and Lemos [14] to tolerate up to half of senders being simultaneously faulty with a latency of three rounds. A more recent protocol also requires a majority of active nodes, handles benign faults, and is extended to work in systems with event-triggered scheduling [5] . Authors of [32] identify a class of non-failsilent faults which are not fully tolerated by the TTP/C membership protocol even if bus guardians are used, and fix the problem under the single-fault assumption. Our protocols tolerate multiple coincident non-Byzantine and Byzantine faults and have the same message complexity as existing ones, with the exception of the partitionable membership protocol which requires Oð2NÞ bits per message. Due to their add-on and generic nature, our protocols have a higher latency.
Current TT platforms offer different levels of integration of online diagnosis in the system. SAFEbus compares the outcomes of double-redundant Bus Interface Units to detect and isolate arbitrary faults at the network level. An evolution of SAFEbus which achieves lower hardware costs using a braided ring topology is introduced in [16] . The Time-Triggered Architecture (TTA) [20] integrates membership with clock synchronization. Experimental evaluation has pointed out some limitations of this integrated approach [31] . The TTA approach of tolerating transient upsets by detecting faulty nodes and by letting them converge to a correct state is discussed in [32] . Such rejuvenation techniques are orthogonal to our work, which only focuses on fault detection, but can be easily integrated with it. The current FlexRay specification [15] allows the use of a Network Management Vector whose functionalities are analogous to membership and leaves it up to the applications to implement this functionality. Our protocols represent a viable and generic solution in this context.
SYSTEM AND FAULT MODEL
System Model
We assume a synchronous distributed system model where there are known upper bounds on the execution time of jobs and communication delays. We assume that each correct node is equipped with a local clock of high precision, i.e., the drift between clock time and physical time is bounded. Clocks of different nodes are synchronized. In the traditional synchronous, or frame-based, computational model [24] , [28] , nodes execute synchronous rounds in a lock step manner. During each round, the nodes alternate two phases: first send and receive their messages in parallel (communication phase), and only then, compute the received messages in parallel (computation phase). Many TT systems, however, do not enforce this strict lock step model. In order to maximize the utilization of the resources of a node, communication and computation within one node are executed in parallel if possible. These systems also allow overlapping computation and communication phases at different nodes in order to use cheaper shared communication buses which require sequential access.
We consider a generic model that encompasses most TT platforms. The system consists of N nodes having unique IDs f1; . . . ; Ng. We assume that each node is assigned a time window, called sending slot, in a larger periodic time window called round. Each node has exactly one sending slot per round. We assume, without loss of generality, that node IDs are assigned consistently with the order of the sending slots in the round: Node j does not complete its sending slot before node i if i < j. A round starts with the beginning of its first sending slot. The periodic global communication schedule defines when each slot begins and terminates. It is static and defined at design time. For example, in classic frame-based systems, all nodes have the same sending slot, whereas sending slots of different nodes never overlap in TDMA systems such as [21] or [15] .
Each node has a communication controller which executes the global communication schedule. We refer to the subsystem composed by the communication controller and the communication buses as network level, while the rest of the system is the application level. Network-level communication among jobs running on different nodes is abstracted through a vector of shared variables hv 1 ; . . . ; v N i, called interface variables, available at each node. Variable v i can only be written by jobs running on node i. When the sending slot of node i is reached, the value of v i at node i is broadcasted by the communication controller of i. All other nodes update their local copy of the variable as soon as the sending slot is completed. Nodes can identify the correct senders of the messages they receive.
The network cannot undetectably forge or corrupt messages. Error detection on the value domain is usually ensured by sending redundant data along with the message, for example, by adding CRC codes. Also, due to the synchrony of the system, it is always possible to accurately detect missing messages by using timeouts. In all TT platforms, the communication controllers detect errors at network level and signal them to the applications through validity bits that are paired to each interface variable. The communication controller of node j sets the validity bit of v i to 0 iff node j was not able to receive the last message sent by i that was supposed to update v i , and to 1 otherwise. For i ¼ j, the communication controller checks if it can itself read the messages it sends, for example, by using a local collision detector.
Besides the global communication schedule, each node has its own internal node schedule that determines when jobs are executed in the round. Similar to the global communication schedule, the node schedule is static and defined at design time. The node schedule can have an effect on the "freshness" of the interface variables, which is the round where the values of the interface variables were sent. For example, if a job is executed during a round, it may read some values sent in the previous rounds and some values send in the current one. The node schedule also determines the freshness of the data sent on the bus. A job running on node i which is started at round k and writes data onto its interface variable is able to send this data during the same round k only if it is scheduled to start before the beginning of the sending slot of i in k. To increase the portability of our add-on protocol, our protocol is parameterized and does not constrain the scheduling of nodes. Diagnostic jobs running at node i have two parameters l i and send curr round i to represent different node schedules. The use of these parameters is discussed in detail in Section 4.
Fault Model
Nodes are categorized based on the faults they encounter. Correct nodes follow the specification of our protocols, have a correct state, and can correctly communicate with the other correct nodes. Obedient nodes follow the specification of our protocols and have a correct state, but they may suffer detectable faults at the network level which prevent them from sending messages to any node. Correct nodes are thus also obedient. Byzantine nodes do not follow the specification of our protocols and can have any state. Note that there is no error propagation at the network level. Faulty nodes are fail-silent at the network level, and therefore, cannot disrupt the network-level communication among other nodes.
Faults refer to communication errors as they are observed at the application level. They are partitioned into three classes, based on their severity and symmetry [33] : Symmetric benign, symmetric Byzantine, and asymmetric. Symmetric benign (or simply benign) faults produce errors which can be locally detected by all nodes in the system. We say that there is a local error detection between node i and node j at round r if j is obedient, i broadcasts a message at round r, and the validity bit of the local copy of the variable v i held by j is set to 0 after the sending slot of i at round r is completed. We say that node i suffers a symmetric benign fault, or a send omission, at round r if there is a local error detection between i and all obedient nodes at round r. For example, a crashed node permanently displays benign faults. Obedient nodes can also be benign faulty.
Node i suffers a symmetric Byzantine fault at round r if i sends an erroneous message at round r which is not conformal to the system specification, all obedient nodes receive the same erroneous message from i at round r, and there is no local error detection between i and any other obedient node at round r. An example of symmetric Byzantine fault is when an undetected memory error in node i corrupts some value which is then written into v i and broadcasted to all other nodes. Network-level error detection cannot determine that the message is erroneous, so the corrupted value is consistently received by all obedient nodes.
Node i suffers an asymmetric fault at round r in all remaining cases where i sends a message and either there is a local detection between i and some obedient node j in round r, or some obedient node j receives in round r an erroneous message from i which is not conformal to the system specification. In the worst case, asymmetric faults can be unconstrained Byzantine faults [22] . We say that an obedient node j suffers a receive omission at round r if some node i is asymmetric faulty and there is a local error detection between i and j. An asymmetric fault can result in any number of receive omissions. Asymmetries in the reception of messages can be an effect, for example, of Slightly-Off-Specification faults (SOS) [1] , when the clock of a node is close to the allowed offset, and thus, the messages it sends are seen as timely only by a subset of the receivers. Another example is when electromagnetic interferences disturb only part of the bus.
We classify nodes based on the faults they encounter over one execution of the protocol. If a node displays different type of faults, we consider the most severe one-benign being the least severe and asymmetric the most. Let a, s, and b represent the maximum number of asymmetric, symmetric, Byzantine and benign faulty nodes over one execution. Our diagnostic and membership protocols of Sections 4 and 5 assume that the number of nodes in the system is
A membership protocol to tolerate permanent and transient network partitions is discussed in Appendix A, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ TDSC.2010.23.
THE ONLINE DIAGNOSTIC PROTOCOL
The purpose of the online diagnostic protocol is to detect and exclude faulty nodes from the system at runtime. The protocol outputs at each round the set of active nodes which are deemed operational, and requires no inputs from other applications. It is composed of two algorithms. The first algorithm forms a consistent health vector to consistently locate benign faulty senders, and the second accumulates the diagnostic information using the p/r algorithm to distinguish (in a probabilistic manner) between healthy and unhealthy nodes.
At each round, each node i runs the diagnostic job diag i which sends a nonreplicated diagnostic message dm i and receives all the other interface variables hdm 1 ; . . . ; dm N i. The communication controller provides a validity bit for each interface variable dm j sent from diag j to diag i using its local error detection mechanisms. By checking the validity bits of the diagnostic messages, the protocol diagnoses communication errors. The local syndrome of node i at round k is the binary N-tuple containing the validity bits of the messages sent to i at round k À 1. The diagnostic message dm i contains the local syndrome broadcasted by node i and its size is OðNÞ.
The diagnostic protocol consists of five phases:
1. Local detection: Communication errors are locally detected by observing the local validity bits of the diagnostic messages. A new local syndrome is formed as a binary N-tuple. 2. Dissemination: The local syndrome is broadcasted using the diagnostic message dm i . 3. Aggregation: Collect all local syndromes dm j corresponding to the same previous diagnosed round. Form a diagnostic matrix for that round where row i is the local syndrome sent from node i and column j is a vector representing the opinion on node j of all other nodes. 4. Analysis: A binary N-tuple called consistent health vector, which contains the consistent distributed view on the health of all system nodes in the diagnosed round, is calculated. To combine the local syndromes sent by different nodes, a hybrid voting [34] , [23] over the columns of the diagnostic matrix is performed. 5. Update counters: Based on the consistent health vector, update the penalty and reward counters associated to nodes and possibly eliminate faulty nodes from the active ones. The phases of the protocol are executed in consecutive rounds, and phases of multiple instances of the protocol are interleaved at each execution of diag i (Fig. 1) . The pseudocode of the diagnostic job diag i , running on each node i, is presented in Algorithm 1. For simplicity of presentation, the pseudocode assumes that the round number k is known by the algorithm, although this is not necessary in the actual implementation if the values of some variables in the last two rounds are buffered.
Consistent Location of Faulty Senders
Local detection and aggregation entail reading the interface variables and their validity bits. As we do not constrain the scheduling of the diagnostic jobs in a round, we need to consider that diagnostic jobs running on different nodes at the same round can read different values with different freshness from the same interface variables.
Consider a diagnostic job diag i which, at round k, reads from the interface variables the values of the diagnostic messages dm 1 ; . . . ; dm N and their validity bits. As diagnostic messages are sent at every round, the read values were sent (following the sending order) either at round k or k À 1.
Hence, there is a locally known integer l i 2 ½1; N, determined by the internal schedule of diag i within node i, such that values of dm 1 ; . . . ; dm li were sent at round k, while values dm liþ1 ; . . . ; dm N were sent at round k À 1 (see Fig. 2 ). The same holds for the validity bits of the messages. In Fig. 1 , for example,
Note that from the system model, a diagnostic job diag i which is executed between the completion of the last sending slot of round k and the beginning of the first sending slot of round k þ 1 is treated as it was executed at round k and l i is thus set to N. Therefore, in a frame-based system with synchronous rounds, we have l j ¼ N for all nodes j.
For all diagnostic jobs executed at round k to consistently use aligned diagnostic messages (respectively, validity bits) from round k À 1, the protocol executes a read alignment operation ( Fig. 2 ; Algorithm 1, lines 3-6). Read alignment combines in variables al m½j (respectively, al ls k ½j) values m kÀ1 ½1; . . . ; l i (respectively, ls kÀ1 ½1; . . . ; l i ) read in the previous round k À 1 and of m k ½l iþ1 ; . . . ; N (respectively, ls k ½l iþ1 ; . . . ; N) read in the current one. This requires buffering of messages and validity bits of the last two or three rounds, and introduces additional delays in the communication. If all nodes can read the messages sent in the current round, the constant u is set to 0 and no buffering is used. The latency of the protocol is reduced in this case.
For local detection, the validity bits are copied into the vector ls k (line 2) and combined using read alignment (lines 3-6). The vector al ls k contains at round k the local syndromes corresponding to the messages sent at round k À 1.
During the dissemination phase, a send alignment is also needed to ensure that despite unconstrained node scheduling, all local syndromes sent at round k refer to a same previous diagnosed round, as required by the aggregation phase. We define the predicate send curr round i to be true if, according to the internal schedule of node i, the diagnostic messages formed by the diagnostic job diag i after being started at round k can be sent at round k, that is, diag i writes onto its interface variable v i before the sending slot of i in k. In Fig. 1 , for example, send curr round 1 does not hold, but it holds for all other nodes. In a frame-based system with synchronous rounds, send curr round i does not hold for any node. This is because each computational phase is followed by a communication phase in the next round.
As rounds start with the beginning of their first sending slot, send curr round i does not hold for at least one diagnostic job. Send alignment is thus used to let all nodes consistently wait one round before sending the local syndromes computed in a round (line 7). If a job completes its execution after the sending slot of its node, it writes its current aligned local syndrome (line 8). This ensures that all local syndromes sent in a round are computed in the same round. In frame-based systems with synchronous rounds, send curr round i does not hold for any node and all nodes write their current local syndromes for round k. These are all consistently sent it in the next round.
The aggregation phase first copies into the vector m k the values of the local syndromes sent by all diagnostic jobs through the diagnostic messages (line 2). A special error value " is assigned to local syndromes whose validity bit is 0. Read alignment is used to guarantee that all jobs executed at round k form a diagnostic matrix using local syndromes sent at round k À 1, which refer to the same diagnosed round (lines 3-6); vector al m½j represents the jth row of the matrix. The jth element of the local syndrome sent by node i to node n can assume three possible values: 0, if i was not able to receive the message from node j in the slot of interest; 1, if i was able to receive the message from j; ", if n was not able to receive the local syndrome from i correctly. For example, Table 1 shows the diagnostic matrix formed, in case nodes 3 and 4 are two (coincident) benign faulty senders in both the diagnosed round and the dissemination round.
As faults can occur during the dissemination phase of the protocol, the diagnostic matrices can contain incorrect or incomplete information, and different nodes can form different diagnostic matrices due to asymmetric faults. However, a consistent global view on faults in the diagnosed round can be obtained by combining different local views using a hybrid voting function H-maj(V ) (1) over the columns V of the matrix. The opinion of a node about itself is considered unreliable and discarded to tolerate asymmetric faults. Thus, voting is executed over the ðN À 1Þ-tuple V of local syndromes representing the opinions of the other nodes (lines 9-11). In order to tolerate benign faults, a hybrid voting function excludes erroneous votes " from V (exclðV ; "Þ) before calculating the majority [23] :
and jexclðV ; "Þj ! 1; 1; else:
The consistent health vector cons hv is the outcome of the hybrid majority voting and contains, at round k, the agreed view on the health of each node at the diagnosed round d round, where the value 0 denotes a faulty node. In case no correct vote is available (jexclðV ; "Þj ¼ 0), the voting function cannot reach a decision. From the fault assumption, this implies that a þ s ¼ 0, and thus, the local syndrome represents a correct and consistent value for the health vector.
Filtering Unhealthy Nodes
The consistent health vector is given as an input (Algorithm 1, line 12) to the p/r algorithm (Algorithm 2). The p/r algorithm considers an extended fault model where all nodes alternate periods of faulty and correct behavior [30] . A node is healthy if it suffers only sporadic and external transient faults, and unhealthy if it suffers internal faults which manifest as intermittent or permanent communication faults. The model implicitly assumes that internal faults will manifest at the interface of the node as either permanent sender faults (a long faulty burst), or intermittent faults with a shorter time to reappearance than external transient faults.
The p/r algorithm uses the consistent health vector to eliminate unhealthy nodes from the set of active nodes active, which is a vector with one entry for each node. Entries of active are initially set to 1 and are later set to 0 when a node is excluded from the set of active nodes. Each node keeps a penalty and a reward counter for each node in the system in the vectors penalties and rewards. All counters are initially set to 0. Every time a new consistent health vector is available, penalties and rewards are updated for each node (Algorithm 2, line 2). As the health assessment of the system stored in vector cons hv is consistently calculated in Algorithm 1, the penalty and reward counters are always consistently updated, and thus, exclusions can be consistently decided in the same round by all obedient nodes.
When a node j is deemed faulty (Algorithm 2, lines 4-7), the corresponding penalty is increased by a value criticalities½j ! 1. If the penalty value of j exceeds a predefined penalty threshold P > 0, j is eliminated from the set of active nodes. Criticalities higher than 1 are used to speed up the exclusion of nodes hosting safety-critical applications. The entry of a node j in the vector criticalities is defined based on the highest criticality class among all the applications hosted by j, as described in Section 8 and [30] .
If a node j is deemed correct, (Algorithm 2, lines 4-12), its reward value is increased by one. If the reward value of j exceeds a predefined reward threshold R > 0, both its penalty and reward value are reset to 0.
The penalty and reward thresholds and the corresponding counters represent two different kinds of information: the reward threshold indicates the minimum number of consecutive fault-free slots a node needs to display before the memory of its previous faults is reset; the penalty threshold bounds the maximum number of consecutive faulty slots a node is allowed to display before isolation. After a bounded amount of time either of thresholds is exceeded, resulting in isolation of the node or reset of the counters, respectively. The penalty (respectively, reward) threshold must be tuned to maximize (respectively, minimize) the probability of excluding unhealthy (respectively, healthy) nodes from the set of active nodes. These two objectives require making a complex trade-off [30] . In Section 8, we show how to do this in a practical system.
Exclusion, Reintegration, and Start-Up
The vector active contains the status of activity of each node and represents the output of the protocol (Algorithm 1, line 12). Any traffic generated by isolated nodes is ignored by the diagnostic jobs. Isolated nodes thus become equivalent to benign faulty nodes. Upon reintegration of an inactive node, the value of the corresponding element is set back to the initial value 1 (up) and its traffic is considered again. A detailed exposition of reintegration techniques is outside the scope of this paper, so the algorithm only sets activity bits to 0 (isolated). In order to be reintegrated into the set by our application-level protocol, a node first has to be correctly reintegrated into the TT platform at the network level. After this is done, reintegration must fulfill three tasks. First, the new node has to know the current set of active nodes. Second, the node has to acquire the current value of the penalty and reward values for all the other nodes in the system. Third, the other nodes must include the reintegrating node into the set. The criticalities and the penalty and reward thresholds for all nodes are statically assigned at design time.
Online reintegration can entail additional bandwidth and computational costs. Other existing protocols for TT systems [21] , [3] , [14] let nodes exchange their active sets, or membership views, at each round. This information is used both for detecting and excluding faulty nodes and for online reintegration. Our transient fault handling approach decouples the diagnosis of faults from the decision on node exclusions, and requires that these two types of information are sent separately. Sending the active sets stored by the nodes requires additional OðNÞ bits per message. After joining the TT network, the reintegrating node first tries to find out the set of active nodes. In order to tolerate Byzantine nodes sending incorrect active sets, the reintegrating node must receive active sets from all nodes and execute hybrid voting.
Reintegrating nodes also need to recover the current penalty and reward counters for all the active nodes identified in the previous step. Nodes send counter information of only a single node at each round to reduce bandwidth consumption. Further reduction is achieved by sending the penalty and reward value of a node over three rounds. First, the ID of a node is sent, then its current penalty value, and finally, its reward value. Reintegrating nodes collect this information from all active nodes and execute hybrid voting to tolerate Byzantine faults.
Penalty and reward values of active nodes are continuously updated during reintegration. Reintegrating nodes receive diagnostic messages, calculate the consistent health vector, and update the penalty and reward counters they have already recovered. However, they do not send protocol messages until they have recovered all the necessary information. Nodes external to the active set can be reintegrated in the set as soon as they begin to send protocol messages and are consistently diagnosed as correct by all other active nodes for the first time. The presence of nodes which are external to the active set can be tolerated by the protocol since they are seen as benign faulty by the other nodes which are already active. The algorithm can easily handle nodes executing start-up as its application-level jobs can participate in the protocol only after their TT communication controller has completed start-up. Nodes whose start-up is not yet completed are simply seen as benign faulty by the other nodes in the active set. Overall, our protocol can provide fault handling for transient and Byzantine faults at the costs of higher bandwidth requirements for online reintegration.
Properties of the Diagnostic Protocol
In this section, we prove the properties of the diagnostic protocol, which are:
Correctness: a correct sender is never diagnosed as faulty in the consistent health vector of any obedient nodes; -Completeness: a benign faulty sender at round k À 2u À 1 is always diagnosed as faulty in the consistent health vector of all obedient nodes at round k; -Consistency: the consistent health vector is agreed by all obedient nodes in each round; and -Consistent Isolation: the set of active nodes is agreed by all obedient nodes in each round. The diagnostic delay for completeness, which is 2u þ 1 rounds, depends on the constant u 2 f0; 1g defined in Algorithm 1. If read alignment is used, then u is equal to 1 and this reflects the additional delay given by buffering messages.
We remark that in our extended fault model, these properties hold for obedient nodes, i.e., both correct nodes and nodes encountering omission faults. These properties imply that an obedient node is able to exclude itself from the set of active nodes and become silent.
We first prove that the diagnostic matrix used for the hybrid voting consists of validity bits of messages sent in the same round. Next, we study the conditions under which the hybrid voting is able to calculate a consistent health vector that provides for the four properties defined above.
Lemma 1.
If node i is obedient and diag i reads the vector m k 6 ¼ "
(respectively, the vector ls k ) at round k, then m k ½j with j 2 f1 . . . l i g contains the diagnostic message dm j sent by node j to i at (respectively, contain the validity bits of the messages sent by all nodes to i at) round k, while m k ½j with j 2 fl i þ 1 . . . Ng contains the diagnostic message dm j sent by node j at (respectively, contain the validity bits of the messages sent by all nodes to i at) round k À u.
Proof. From the definition of l i , the values of the interface variables with index in f1 . . . l i g read by diag i at round k (Algorithm 1, line 2) were sent in round k, while the values of the other interface variables were sent in round k À u. The same holds for the corresponding validity bits. The existence of l i follows from the system model. Interface variables and validity bits are updated at every round and are immediately updated when the sending slot is completed. Also, node IDs, and thus, interface variables too are given indexes which follow the order of completion of the sending slots of the nodes. t u Lemma 2. If node i is obedient and the vector al m 6 ¼ " (respectively, al ls k ) is computed by diag i at round k, then al m½j (respectively, al ls k ) contains the diagnostic message dm j sent by node j to node i at (respectively, the validity bits of the messages sent by all nodes to i at) round k À u.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 1 and from the fact that read alignment (Algorithm 1, lines 3-6) copies into the vector al m 6 ¼ " (respectively, al ls k ) the values (respectively, the validity bits) of the interface variables with indexes f1 . . . l i g as they are read in round k À u, and copies the values (respectively, the validity bits) of the remaining interface variables as they are read in round k. t u
Lemma 3. For all obedient nodes i, if diag i sends at round k a diagnostic message dm i , this contains the values of al ls kÀ1 .
Proof. The predicate send curr round j cannot be true for all nodes j since this would imply that at least one job diag i is executed before the first sending slot of each round k and after the last sending slot of round k À 1. In this case, by definition, we consider diag i as executing in round k À 1, and therefore, send curr round i is false, a contradiction. If send curr round j is true only for a proper subset S of the nodes, then for each obedient node j 2 S, diag j writes into v j at round k the value al ls kÀ1 , which is sent at round k by definition of send curr round j (Algorithm 1, line 8) . For all other obedient nodes i 6 2 S, diag i writes into v i at round k À 1 the value al ls kÀ1 , which is sent at round k by definition of send curr round i (Algorithm 1, line 7) . t u Lemma 4. If nodes i and j are obedient, the value of al m½j 6 ¼ " computed by diag i at round k contains al ls kÀuÀ1 computed by diag j at round k À u À 1.
Proof. From Lemma 3, the diagnostic job diag j sends at round k À u a diagnostic message dm j containing the value of al ls kÀuÀ1 . From Lemma 2, the value of dm j sent by j at round k À u is copied in al m½j by diag i at round k. t u Lemma 5. If there exists a node j and a value v such that for all the obedient nodes i, diag i computes al ls kÀuÀ1 ½j ¼ v, then for each obedient node i, the value of cons hv½j calculated by diag i at round k is v.
Proof 
The consistent health vector cons hv calculated by each obedient node at round k guarantees correctness, completeness, and consistency.
Proof. By definition, no obedient node sets its validity bit to 0 for a correct node or to 1 for a benign node. Correctness and completeness thus follow from Lemmas 2 and 5. Let us assume by contradiction that consistency is violated and two obedient nodes calculate two different cons hv½j entries for the same node j. Since H-maj is a deterministic function, the two nodes must have voted on different vectors V ¼ hal m½1½j; . . . ; al m½j À 1½j; al m½j þ 1; ½j; . . . ; al m½N½j. This implies that there exists at least one asymmetric faulty node l 6 ¼ j such that value of al m½l, which is taken from a diagnostic messages dm l sent by node l, is received differently by the two obedient nodes. However, as a ! 1 by assumption, the node j is either correct, or benign, or symmetric Byzantine. In all these cases, all obedient nodes set their validity bit of the message sent m by j at round k À 2u À 1 to the same value v by definition. From Lemma 2, al ls kÀuÀ1 ½j is the validity bit for m. From Lemma 5, v is contained in the cons hv½j calculated by all obedient nodes, a contradiction. t u
Since the p/r algorithm deterministically updates penalties and rewards according to the consistent health vector, the following theorem follows as a corollary of Theorem 1: Theorem 2. The active vector calculated by each job at round k guarantees consistent isolation.
THE TUNABLE MEMBERSHIP PROTOCOL
A common approach to fault tolerance in distributed systems is to use a group membership service to preserve node consistency and trigger recovery actions and reconfigurations. Similar to the diagnostic protocol, membership outputs a set of active nodes, called the view in membership protocols, and requires no inputs from other applications.
Our membership protocol differs from diagnosis as it does not only detect send omissions, but also receive omissions. When an asymmetric fault occurs, nodes may be partitioned into two sets, termed as cliques, such that only members of one clique received the message from the faulty node. The membership protocol is able to detect the formation of cliques and consistently diagnose them in the consistent health vector. Membership protocols support replication of deterministic applications by identifying at each time the set of nodes, called view, that have received the same history of messages. This guarantees that the deterministic jobs hosted by the nodes have a consistent internal state. Full interreplica consistency requires, for example, that nodes suffering from even a single receive omission are excluded from the view. In fact, retransmitting lost messages in a timely manner is not always possible and is also complex and resource-consuming. However, a membership protocol that does not overreact to transient faults needs to relax its consistency guarantees. Our membership protocol features a new consistency property, called tunable view synchrony, which results from the combination of a clique detection protocol and the p/r algorithm.
Compared to the diagnostic protocol of Section 4, this membership protocol detects a larger range of omission faults. Also, different from existing membership protocols which assume restricted failure models, our protocol keeps a consistent view among all nodes even in presence of asymmetric Byzantine faults. A limitation of the approach is that it is impossible to distinguish between benign receive omissions and Byzantine faults which creates cliques by not sending messages, or by sending inconsistent local syndromes, only to a subset of the nodes in the current view. In worst-case scenarios, these faults can thus, in principle, impact availability. Our protocol is, however, practical because it is designed for closed systems where asymmetric Byzantine faults at the application level have a random nature and are sporadic.
A version of the membership protocol which also tolerates partitions is presented in Appendix A, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http:// doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TDSC.2010.23.
Location of Cliques and Relaxed Consistency
The pseudocode of a membership job memb i running on node i is shown in Algorithm 3. It is a modification of the diagnostic protocol of Section 4 which introduces minority accusations to detect and locate minority cliques. In the diagnostic protocol, the analysis phase produces an agreed consistent health vector which uniquely identifies the set of messages that did not suffer from send omissions. In case of receive omissions where only a clique of nodes can receive a certain message, an obedient node j that is a member of a minority clique can be identified because its local syndrome disagrees with the consistent health vector on the health of some other node h. In order to accuse j, the new protocol executes the analysis and assigns minority accusations before the formation and dissemination of aligned local syndromes al ls k (Algorithm 3, lines 10-11). Members of the minority clique are then consistently deemed faulty when the analysis of al ls k is executed. The reason for disseminating and agreeing on minority accusations rather than using them directly to calculate the new view is to prevent inconsistency on the view if different versions of the local syndromes are disseminated by a Byzantine node j. In this case, only a subset of obedient nodes may assign minority accusations to j.
The outcome of clique detection and location is a consistent health vector cons hv which accuses all members of a minority clique. In order not to exclude a node from a view when transient omissions occur, it is possible to delay view changes, and thus, relax consistency. This is made possible by combining the clique detection protocol and the p/r algorithm. The resulting membership view vector memb view identifies the current members of the view and represents the output of the protocol (line 14). Different tunings of the p/r algorithms not only result in a different likelihood of node isolation, but also allow to customize the degree of consistency among nodes. If the penalty threshold P is set to 1, nodes are excluded after every single-message omission, and full consistency is ensured. When P is greater than 1, the new property of tunable view synchrony ensures that the extent of the divergence among nodes in the same view is bounded. A node in the current view is considered to be fully consistent with the others after it is a member of the majority clique for a sufficient number of rounds, regardless of its previous faults.
The relaxed consistency semantics of tunable view synchrony is suitable for all applications of our actual aerospace and automotive setups as detailed in Section 8. In general, we believe that many applications for TT systems, especially control applications, can benefit from tunable view synchrony to improve node availability in the presence of transient faults.
Properties of Tunable Membership
In this section, we prove that the views identified by the membership vector memb vect satisfy two fundamental properties: tunable membership liveness that guarantees the activation of view changes when inconsistencies arise, and tunable view synchrony that ensures that all consistent nodes are included in the view. In order to formally define these properties, some auxiliary definitions are first needed.
A view is a set of nodes which initially includes all nodes in the system. The membership view vector memb view flags the members of the current view with a 1 in the corresponding entry. The aim of the protocol is to include in the view exactly the nodes that are "sufficiently" consistent with each other.
Send and receive omissions on a message m partition the view into two subsets, or cliques, of nodes that have (respectively, have not) access to the updated values of some interface variables. These are called majority and minority cliques based on the consistent diagnosis of the sender of m resulting from the consistent health vector. Formally, we say that a node i is diagnosed as correct (respectively, faulty) by an obedient node j at round r if memb j computes cons hv½i ¼ 1 (respectively, cons hv½i ¼ 0) at round r þ 2u þ 1. We say that an obedient node i is member of the minority clique at round r if i is benign faulty at round r, or there is no local error detection nor minority accusation at round r between i and a node j which is diagnosed as faulty at round r by some obedient node l, or there is a local error detection or a minority accusation at round r between i and a node j which is diagnosed as correct at round r by some obedient node l.
The consistency property of the protocol refers to a suffix of the history of messages sent in the last rounds. Given an obedient node i, we call divergence set of i with recovery latency d after round k div i ðk; dÞ the set of rounds k 0 k such that i is in a minority clique in k 0 and there exists no d consecutive rounds k 0 < k 00 k, where i is in a majority clique in k 00 . The cardinality of the divergence set of i multiplied by its criticality level criticalities½i is called divergence degree with recovery latency d after round k. Divergence degree is an important concept because it is used to tune the consistency provided by the membership protocol. In the presence of simple message omissions, nodes with a divergence degree equal to zero have received exactly the same history of messages in the last R (or more) rounds.
The membership view vector calculated by the membership protocol Algorithm 3 must satisfy the following properties given a penalty threshold P > 0 and reward threshold R > u þ 1: -Tunable Membership Liveness: If after any round k À 3u À 2, the divergence degree with recovery latency R À u À 1 of any obedient node i in the current view v is greater or equal to 2P , all obedient nodes agree upon a new unique view v 0 v n fig at round k. -Tunable View Synchrony: If a new view v 0 is formed after a view v at round k, it includes all obedient nodes in v whose divergence degrees with recovery latency R þ u þ 1 in rounds k À 2u À 1 are smaller than dP =2e. Tunable membership liveness imposes that a new view is established after a loss of consistency. The degree of the allowed inconsistency can be tuned using the parameters of the p/r algorithm. Tunable view synchrony ensures that after a new view v 0 is established, which might take up to five rounds, all nodes in the new view v 0 have a maximum divergence smaller than P .
Due to the similarity between the diagnostic and the membership protocols, the following proofs of correctness can use some results of Section 4. As read and send alignment are the same in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3, Lemmas 1-3 hold in both protocols, with the exception of the result of Lemma 2 for al ls k which only holds if al ls k is not modified by minority accusations. Furthermore, the hybrid majority function is the same in Algorithms 1 and 3, so Lemma 5 holds also for membership. The result of Lemma 2 for al ls k is extended to minority accusations by the following lemma: Lemma 6. If nodes i and j are obedient, the value al ls k ½j computed by memb i at round k is 0 if and only if: 1) the validity bit of the message sent by j to i at round k À u is 0 or 2) the diagnostic message dm j sent by j to i at round k À u is different from cons hv.
Proof. We first prove that only if implication. Assume by contradiction that al m½j½l computed by memb i at round k is 0, but 1) and 2) are false. The value of al ls k ½j can be set to 0 either during read alignment (Algorithm 3, lines 2-6) or during minority accusations (Algorithm 3, lines 10-11). In the first case, Lemma 2 holds for Algorithm 3 as we do not consider minority accusations and this implies that 1) is true, a contradiction. Therefore, the value of al ls k ½j is set to 0 by memb i through the minority accusation because cons hv 6 ¼ al m½j at round k. Since 1) is false, the value of al m½j computed by memb i at round k is not " and from Lemma 2, it contains the diagnostic message dm j sent by j to i at round k À u. Therefore, 2) is true, a contradiction.
The if implication follows from the fact that obedient nodes only accuse nodes by reading validity bits and assigning minority accusations, so cases 1) and 2) are the only ones where accusations can be generated. t u Lemma 7. All obedient nodes agree on the consistent health vector calculated at each round k.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that consistency is violated and two obedient nodes calculate two different cons hv½j entries for the same node j. Since H-maj is a deterministic function, the two nodes must have voted on different vectors V ¼ hal m½1½j; . . . ; al m½j À 1½j; al m½j þ 1; ½j; . . . ; al m½N½j. This implies that there exists at least one asymmetric faulty node l 6 ¼ j such that value of al m½l, which is taken from a diagnostic messages dm l sent by node l, is received differently by the two obedient nodes. However, as a ! 1 by assumption, the node j is either correct, or benign, or symmetric Byzantine. In all these cases, all correct nodes set their validity bit for the message sent by j at round k À 2u À 1 to the same value by definition, and all obedient nodes receive the same value of the diagnostic message dm j sent by j at round k À 2u À 1. From Lemma 6, the same value v is contained in al ls kÀuÀ1 ½j calculated by each obedient node, and thus, from Lemma 5 also in cons hv½j, a contradiction. t u Lemma 8. If an obedient node i is benign faulty at round k À 2u À 1, the cons hv calculated by each obedient node at round k is such that cons hv½i ¼ 0.
Proof. If i suffers a send omission at round k À 2u À 1, then, by definition, the validity bit for the message sent by i to all obedient nodes is set to 0 by all obedient nodes in that round. From Lemma 6, all obedient node set al ls kÀuÀ1 ½i ¼ 0 at round k À u À 1. The result thus follows from Lemma 5. t u Lemma 9. If an obedient node i is member of a minority clique at round k À 3u À 2, the cons hv calculated by all obedient nodes at round k À u À 1 or at round k is such that cons hv½i ¼ 0.
Proof. If node i is benign faulty at round k À 3u À 2, the result follows from Lemma 8. Else, we only consider the case where there is no local error detection nor minority accusation at round k À 3u À 2 between i and a node j which is diagnosed as correct at round k À 3u À 2 by some obedient node l. The other case is, in fact, symmetric. From Lemma 7, for all obedient nodes l, diag l calculates the same cons hv at round k À u À 1. By hypothesis and from Lemma 6, diag i computes al ls kÀ2uÀ2 ½j ¼ 0 at round k À 2u À 2. From Lemma 3, diag i sends at round k À 2u À 1 a message dm i such that dm i ½j ¼ 0. For every obedient node l, either there is a local error detection between i and l at round k À 2u À 1, or l receives dm j , which is, by definition, different from cons hv. In both cases, it follows from Lemmas 6 and 5 that at round k, all obedient node computes cons hv½i ¼ 0.
t u Lemma 10. For each obedient node i, if i is a member of the majority clique at rounds k À 3u À 2 and k À 2u À 1, then the consistent health vector calculated by each obedient node at round k is such that cons hv½i ¼ 1.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that i is a member of the majority clique at rounds k À 3u À 2 and k À 2u À 1 and the value of cons hv½i calculated by obedient nodes at round k is 0. From Lemma 5, if all obedient nodes set al ls kÀuÀ1 ½i ¼ 1 at round k À u À 1, we would have a contradiction. Therefore, at least one obedient node j has set al ls kÀuÀ1 ½i ¼ 0. From Lemma 6 and from the fact that i is not benign faulty at round k À 2u À 1, the diagnostic message dm i sent by i to j at round k À 2u À 1 is different from the cons hv calculated at round k À u À 1. From Lemma 3, dm i contains the value of al ls kÀ2uÀ2 computed by i at round k À 2u À 2. From Lemma 6, the al ls kÀ2uÀ2 vector is computed based on the messages received at round k À 3u À 2. The fact that al ls kÀ2uÀ2 is different from the cons hv calculated at round k À u À 1 contradict the fact that i is in a majority clique. t u
The correctness of clique detection and location is the basis for the activation of necessary view changes when the consistency of some members of the current view becomes too loose. Proof. It follows from Lemma 7 and Algorithm 3, lines [14] [15] that the same view is provided by the protocol to all obedient nodes. Let us assume by contradiction that a node i of the current view has at round k À 3u À 2 a divergence degree
and that a view v 0 computed at round k by all obedient nodes is such that i 2 v 0 . By definition, in each round r 2 div i ðk À 3u À 2; R À u À 1Þ, i was in a minority clique. The penalty value of i is incremented by criticalities½i at a round k 0 if cons hv½i is set to 0 by all obedient nodes in that round. From Lemma 10 and Algorithm 3, line 14, a penalty increment at k 0 for i implies that i is in a minority clique at
where d m and d M are minðdiv i ðk À 3u À 2; R À u À 1ÞÞ and maxðdiv i ðk À 3u À 2; R À u À 1ÞÞ, respectively. The p/r algorithm excludes nodes which have reached the penalty threshold P from the view memb view (Algorithm 2, line 7) . In order not to be excluded from the p/r algorithm, node i must have reset the penalties at least once by accruing rewards in at least R consecutive rounds in ½r 0 ; r
t u Membership liveness could be trivially ensured by a protocol that always returns empty views. Tunable view synchrony rules out these solutions and requires that all nodes having a consistent internal state are included in every new view. Correctness of clique detection is its necessary precondition. Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that an obedient node i with a divergence degree jdiv i ðk 0 ; R þ u þ 1Þj Á criticalities½i < dP =2e for all k 0 k À 2u À 1 is not included from the new view at round k. This can only happen if cons hv½i calculated at some round r k is equal to 0. In this case, the penalty of i is incremented and can exceed the penalty threshold P . From Lemma 10, i was in a minority clique at round r À 3u À 2 or r À 2u À 1. This implies that divergence degree div i ðk 0 ; R þ u þ 1Þ after some round k 0 k À 2u À 1 is not empty. However, div i ðk 0 ; R þ u þ 1Þj Á criticalities½i < dP =2e by hypothesis. From Lemma 9, each of the elements in div i ðk 0 ; R þ u þ 1Þ corresponds to at most two penalty increments (at
If i has been excluded from the view and has reached the penalty threshold P , there must be a round r before or after those in div i ðk 0 ; R þ u þ 1Þ such that cons hv½i ¼ 0 at round r. We show that the reward threshold is reached, and the penalty and reward thresholds are reset, before the penalty is increased once again at round r.
We first show that r cannot follow d M . Let r M be the smallest round > d M where i is in a minority clique. Note that since r M 6 2 div i ðk
by definition of divergence degree and R > 0. From Lemma 10 and as i is in the majority clique at round d M þ 1 and in the immediately following ones (which are at least u þ 1),
has its reward increased in that round and in the immediately following ones. As i is in a minority clique at round r M , i has its penalty increased at round
by definition of divergence degree. As i is in the majority clique at round r m þ 1 and in the immediately following rounds (which are at least u þ 1), its reward is increased at round r m þ 3u þ 3 < d m À R þ 2u þ 2 or before from Lemma 10. As i is in a minority clique at round d m , the penalty of i is again increased at round d m þ 2u þ 1 or later from Lemma 9. Also, in this case, the reward threshold is reached before the penalty is increased again. t u
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOLS
We formally verified the correctness of the diagnostic and membership protocols presented in the previous sections by using model checking [9] . The hand proofs of Sections 4 and 5 show that the protocols satisfy their correctness properties. Model checking is an additional, independent technique to prove these correctness claims. We gave as input to the model checker the pseudocode of our protocols, a description of our fault and system model, and the correctness properties of the protocol expressed in temporal logic. The full inputs for the model checker are in Appendix B, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/ 10.1109/TDSC.2010.23. The model checker makes an exhaustive exploration of the generated state space and searches for a run (termed as counterexample) violating one of the properties. If no counterexample is returned, the property is proved true. Model checkers require a finite representation of the distributed system whose size is small enough to permit exhaustive exploration within reasonable time and memory constraints. The properties of our protocol, however, are proved to hold for systems that are arbitrarily large in terms of the number of nodes. The size of the state space of each node can also grow arbitrarily large as the values of the penalty and reward thresholds P and R are unbounded. The goal of model checking is to verify the most relevant range of finite system behaviors. When computationally feasible, we verified systems with N 6, P 3, R 2, and criticalities½i ¼ 1 for every node i. Such choice of parameters allowed the model checker to explore different combinations of faulty node behaviors such as multiple Byzantine faults (when s ¼ 2 or a ¼ s ¼ 1), receive omissions (a > 0), transient faults (P > 1, R > 1), and partitions (p > 0). The overall system size N is realistic for many practical applications. We have also reduced the size of the models by considering frame-based systems where read and send alignments are not used and where l i ¼ N and send current round i ¼ false for each node i. Adding read and send alignment only adds some delays to the protocol, as shown by Lemmas 1-4 and 6.
The Model Checker
We used the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [12] for formal verification because of its powerful model checkers and expressive input language. In particular, we used the bounded model checker (BMC) of SAL as it performed better (in terms of execution time) than the symbolic one. The fact that BMC is only able to prove invariants was not a limitation, as the properties of both protocols define finite latencies and liveness properties that could be formalized as invariants by storing the requested values over rounds. Although BMC verification is incomplete in general [13] , we proved all the correctness properties of our protocols. Table 2 summarizes the results of the model checking. The verification times ranged from a few minutes with N ¼ 4 to a few hours with N ¼ 6. The experiments were executed on an Intel Xeon 2 GHz machine with 4 GB memory running an SAL 3.0 installation on Fedora Core 6. The BMC engine of SAL used the Yices 1.0.3 satisfiability solver. For the diagnostic protocol, we focused on the properties of Correctness, Completeness, and Consistency. The model checking verified that the result of Theorem 1 is correct under the considered parametric constraints. The property of Consistent Isolation is a corollary of Theorem 1, so we avoided its verification and set P ¼ 1 to reduce the complexity of verification. For the membership protocol, the model checker verified the properties of Tunable Membership Liveness and Tunable View Synchrony, and thus, the correctness of Theorems 3 and 4. We had to restrict the verification of Theorem 3 to N 5 to prevent the size of the model from becoming infeasible.
Properties and Verification Setting
VALIDATION OF THE PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present the results of the experimental validation of the diagnostic and tunable membership protocols. We used physical fault injection to validate the correctness claims of Sections 4 and 5 under the most common fault scenarios. We focused on validating the main correctness properties of the protocol, namely, those regarding the consistent detection of faults, in the most important fault scenarios. A full-fledged validation of the protocol in every possible fault scenario is outside the scope The validation setup consisted of a set of four nodes consisting of a host computer (Infineon Tricore 1796) and a communication controller (Xilinx Virtex 4 FPGA), which are interconnected via a redundant TT network with shared bus topology (layered TTP). Each host computer runs a TT operating system. A diagnostic job runs on each node as an add-on application-level module sending one diagnostic message (of 4 bits) per round. No constraint was imposed on the internal node scheduling besides executing diagnostic jobs once every round. The static node scheduling defined the constant integers l f1;::;Ng and the predicates send curr round f1;::;Ng used by the protocol for the read and the send alignment operations. Interface variables were automatically updated and the validity bits of a message m could be read using the API call tt_Receiver_Status. We also used an additional disturbance node, which is able to emulate hardware faults in the communication network. As the protocol does not discriminate between node and link faults, a wide range of faults in a node could be emulated by corrupting or dropping a message it sends. We observed the internal state of the nodes by using the debugging port of the hosts.
We injected different classes of network-level physical faults on the bus to simulate faults in a deterministic and reproducible manner. Application-level faults were reproduced by modifying the code of one diagnostic job. As we know which faults are injected, we can experimentally evaluate whether the diagnostic protocol is able to detect them. Each experiment class was repeated 100 times. A total of 1,500 fault injection experiments was conducted. The fault injection experiments are summarized in Table 3 . The table reports the reproduced fault type, expressed in terms of the fault model, the level where the fault is injected, the duration of the injection, the number of instances of the experiment (in each instance, different nodes suffer the fault), and the correctness claim which has been validated. Note that in the experiments, the values of p/r parameters such as P and R were chosen to validate the correctness of our implementation prior to the system-specific tunings illustrated in Section 8.
PRACTICAL TUNING OF THE P/R ALGORITHM
In the previous sections, we have provided evidence for the correctness of the diagnostic and membership protocols by means of hand proofs (Sections 4 and 5), formal verification (Section 6), and experimental validation (Section 7). These deterministic correctness properties are necessary but not sufficient for the protocol to correctly discriminate between healthy and unhealthy nodes. This requires a probabilistic tuning of the penalty and reward thresholds and of the criticality levels of each node, which entails doing many trade-offs [30] . In this section, we describe how we have tuned our prototype in order to respect realistic automotive and aerospace requirements. The obtained tuning is summarized in Table 4 .
Characterizing Intermittent Faults
The first difficulty faced during the practical tuning of the protocol is how to characterize unhealthy nodes. The p/r algorithm resets the penalty and reward counters for a node if it does not fail for R consecutive rounds, where R is the reward threshold. If a fault appears before R is reached, it is considered correlated with the previous fault. Therefore, R should be large enough to correlate intermittent faults. The time to reappearance of intermittent faults, however, depends on the specific frequency of fault activation for each node (i.e., which hardware components of the node are damaged and how often they are stimulated by the software) and is unknown in most practical systems.
While setting R, designers must make a probabilistic trade-off between the capability of correlating intermittent faults with a large time to reappearance and the avoidance of incorrect correlation of independent and external transient faults. In Fig. 3 , we show such a trade-off for our automotive and aerospace settings, where the length of the TDMA round is set to T ¼ 2:5 ms. Our practical choice was to set R ¼ 10 6 to correlate faults whose interarrival time is within R Â T ffi 42 min, which can be pragmatically considered a reasonable value. After detecting a transient fault, the resulting probability of correlating a second transient fault is less than 1 percent considering the rates in Fig. 3 . It must be noticed that a healthy node will be isolated only if P subsequent transient faults are correlated, where P is the penalty threshold [30] . In all our prototypes, the probability of isolation of a healthy node is thus negligible.
Defining the Tolerated Outage
To increase availability and accumulate diagnostic data, the p/r algorithm delays the exclusion of nodes from the active set. In the period between fault manifestation and system recovery, applications may be prevented from correctly communicating and may suffer an outage. However, all applications used in our aerospace and automotive settings can tolerate bounded periods of continuous outage of a node before a recovery action is activated to restore the availability of the service or to reach a safe state. We define this upper bound on the recovery latency as tolerated transient outage. A node which alternates tolerably short periods of continuous faulty behavior with long enough periods of correct behavior can be kept in the set of active nodes.
Applications with different criticality classes have different requirements on the maximum tolerated transient outage. Tolerated transient outages for different classes of automotive and aerospace applications are shown in Table 4 . The automotive domain depicts a varied range of criticality classes. Safety critical functionalities are necessary for the physical control of the vehicle with strict reactivity constraints, e.g., X-by-wire. Recovery actions must preserve the availability of the (possibly degraded) service. Safety relevant functionalities support the driver, e.g., the Electronic Stability Control and the Driver Assistant Systems, such as the collision warning and avoidance system. They are not necessary for the control of the car but the driver must know if they are unavailable. Finally, there are Non safetyrelevant functionalities such as comfort and entertainment. In the aerospace domain, only safety critical functionalities are connected to the backbone. The High Lift System adds lift during the flight and is related to the control of flaps. The Landing Gear System controls the retractable wheels used for landing.
Tuning the Tolerated Outage
In order to tune the p/r algorithm according to the required tolerated outages, we need first to identify a penalty threshold P , and then, to define penalty increments for each node, which are stored in the vector criticalities. The tolerated outage is the sum of the detection delay between fault manifestation and its first consistent location as reflected in the consistent health vector, the accumulation delay, when the fault is continuously recorded by the p/r algorithm before the penalty threshold is reached, and the recovery delay required to complete the recovery or reconfiguration actions. In our prototype, the detection delays of both the diagnostic and the more complex membership service are low enough to satisfy the requirements of the highest criticality class considered. Once a faulty node is isolated, each obedient node can instantaneously apply the necessary reconfiguration with no recovery delay.
The tuning of the parameters P and criticalities used by the p/r algorithm can increase the accumulation delay to maximize availability in the presence of transient faults. However, our tuning must also ensure that whenever the outage of a node reaches the maximum tolerated outage of its most critical application, the penalty value for the node reaches the penalty threshold and the node is excluded. In order to find such tuning for the diagnostic protocol, we injected continuous faulty bursts into the network so that all nodes are benign faulty for an amount of time equal to the tolerated outage of the different criticality classes. After the burst is finished, we observed the value of the maximum value reached by the penalty counter of any node if all the entries of the vector criticalities are set to 1. Each experiment was repeated 100 times. If classes c 1 ; . . . ; c n have corresponding maximum penalty counter p 1 ; . . . ; p n , we set P ¼ maxðp 1 ; . . . ; p n Þ. The criticality increment for class c h , termed as incðc h Þ, is set to incðc h Þ ¼ dP =p h e and is used to define the entries of the vector criticalities. If the set of criticality classes of all the applications hosted by node i is C i , we set criticalities½i ¼ max c2C i incðcÞ.
The penalty thresholds and criticality levels for the automotive and aerospace setups are shown in Table 4 . We observed in both setups that even for Safety Critical applications, it is possible to wait for some round before isolating faulty nodes. This enhances the capability of the system of not overreacting to transient faults.
Diagnosis Under Adverse External Conditions
We have shown how we tuned the parameters of the p/r algorithm under normal external conditions. The next step was to try to evaluate the capability of the algorithm to guarantee node availability under adverse external conditions, characterized by an abnormal rate of transient faults. For this purpose, we considered two unfavorable but common scenarios in the automotive and aerospace settings where external faults are highly frequent and will likely be considered as intermittent faults. For the automotive setting, we considered a blinking light causing periodic electrical instabilities on the bus due to an open relay, while for aerospace, we considered a lighting bolt producing a sequence of instabilities with increasing time to reappearance. Systems are designed and tested to tolerate such transient behaviors without taking specific recovery actions; therefore, isolations should be avoided. The length of the faulty bursts, the times to reappearance, and the number of instances of the burst are shown in Table 5 . We reproduced these scenarios in 100 experiments and observed if and after how much time healthy nodes were incorrectly isolated.
In both cases, different transient bursts are considered as correlated by the p/r algorithm. The results for the automotive and aerospace setting are shown in Table 6 . The functionalities with lower criticalities can tolerate longer periods of abnormal transient behavior. The use of a p/r algorithm with varied criticality levels gives advantages in terms of availability. In fact, if nodes were immediately isolated after the first fault appearance, a single abnormal transient period would result in the isolation of all the nodes in the system and would entail a restart of the whole system. However, even using our p/r algorithm, the availability of safety critical functionalities can be harmed by relatively short disturbances in both experimental settings. From this data, we can conclude that the detection of intermittent faults could be sacrificed for the sake of availability for those nodes implementing safety critical functions. For example, isolated nodes could be kept under observation, collecting rewards if a fault-free behavior is observed and reintegrating the node if a specific reward threshold for reintegration is reached [30] .
PORTABILITY ISSUES FOR VARIED TT PLATFORMS
One of our main design goals was to define a diagnostic/ membership protocol that is a tunable and portable add-on application-level module, rather than a static and built-in system-level feature. Our experience has confirmed that this approach is viable. Our protocol only uses detection capabilities that are provided by any TT platform. The concept of validity bit abstracts a number of platform-specific error detection mechanisms, whose outcome can normally be accessed by applications using the basic APIs provided by the host operating system (see Section 7). Another important issue was not to require interactions or to interfere with other applications. For this reason, local detection of faults is implicitly performed by checking the availability of updated diagnostic messages at the application level. This information is provided by all TT platforms. To ease the integration, the bandwidth requirement of the protocol is limited. In our prototype, diagnostic messages were as small as N bits.
Finally, we avoided imposing strong constraints on node scheduling. The read and send alignments ensure that all diagnostic jobs use consistent data for any schedule, provided that the diagnostic jobs are executed at every round. To achieve that, they require the application to know some parameters that are directly related to the node scheduling, such as l f1;::;Ng and send curr round f1;::;Ng (see Section 4) . If a static scheduling policy is used, this information is constant and known at design time. In case of dynamic scheduling, we require the OS to provide this information to the application at runtime. Note that in case of dynamic scheduling, the constant u must be set to 1 because it is impossible to evaluate the global condition needed to set it to 0, and thus, to reduce latency.
CONCLUSIONS
Emerging TT platforms, such as FlexRay, need diagnostic and membership algorithms that are portable, generic, and resistant to the widest possible range of faults. In this paper, we have introduced novel protocols which fulfill these requirements and which can be added-on as a middleware layer on top of any TT platform. Our protocols aim at relaxing the fault assumptions of existing protocols. They can tolerate Byzantine faults and multiple benign faults, and can improve availability even in the presence of transient faults by using a p/r algorithm. The main costs for this sophisticated fault handling compared to existing protocols for TT systems are a slightly higher latency and higher bandwidth costs for online reintegration. The correctness of the protocols is comprehensively substantiated. We have proved the protocol correctness by hand and through formal verification. Furthermore, the protocol has also been experimentally validated under the most common fault scenarios. Finally, we have discussed common trade-offs which arise when handling transient faults. We have shown how to tune the p/r algorithm under realistic automotive and aerospace settings, and addressed open issues of characterization of intermittent faults, determination of the criticality of faults, and diagnosis under adverse external conditions. Jens Koch participated to the EU DECOS project as the referent for Airbus Deutschland GmbH.
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